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ABSTRACT: Charbonnages de France are presently wüming in Lorraine coalfield seams presenüng a
high level ofspontaneous conibustion risk associated with high methane emissions. The operators have
had to establish a strategy' for spontaneous combustion prevention and fight based on several parameters
- linütation ofparasiticairleaks.
- rapid Isolation ofdistricts,
- üierting with nitrogen.
Several conibustions have tumed into gas ignition in the goa£ hopefillly limited to the upper intersection
ofthe longwall face with the air return. As in such cases, after evacuation ofpersoimel, rescue leams
were used to rapidly isolate the afleeted dtstricts by closing doors previously erected for this purpose, on
the intake and retuni roadways.
After Isolation and m order losuppress the fire, the districts have beenkqitunder an inert atmosphere for
a period of almost two months. They have then been reopened in aecordance 'with a stricl methodology.
It has been possjble then to resume coal winning, which has cor.tmued until the nonnal tennination of
l. INTRODUCTION
The coalfield worked by Houilleres du
Bassin de Lorraine (HBL), Charbonnages de
France Group,. is situated in north-eastem
France. This is a dense deposit made up of
two groups of over ten seams of coal,
separated by a conglomerate bed nearly 200
metres thick (figure l).
The upper group consists of a bituminous
soft coal, the lower coke coal.
The field is sharply folded along two
parallel axes resulting in varied types of
workings within the following two ranges of
dip:
• flat seams frorn 8 to 30° or even more
locally;
• steep seams from 60 to 80°
This configuration, together with the great
depth (over 1,000 metres) leads locally to
substantial Stresses causing fairly considerable
initial fissuring or even öacturing of the rock
mass.
The coalfield is also. fairly gassy, with
specific einissions of 50 to 60 m^ of CH4
released per tonne of coal extracted being not
uncommon, necessitating very high aüflows
in the workings (conunonly > 40 rn^/s per
face in Operation) for adequate dilution of the
gas.
Finally some seams have a high
concentration of- pyrite which facilitates
oxidation and accelerates the process of
spontaneous heating.
The principal mining method is the retreat
longwall technique with caving in the flat
seam which accouht for more than 80% of the
Output (figure 2).
On the whole therefore, HBL coalfield has
the following characteristics:
• fissuring related to depth;
• easy oxidation related to the presence of
pyrite;
• high methane content of coal.
• Working the field requires so the use of
large quantities ofair.
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Figure l: Section of the Houilleres du Bassin de Lorraine coalHeld
Figure 2: Diagram of a mcchanised retreating longwall facc
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Hence all the factors that can lead to
spontaneous heating and methane ignition are
present
In fact m the past HBL have had to deal
with many spontaneous combustion tuming
into fires, often leading to the definitive
closure of a district and the abandonment of
its equipmeüt
Over the last seven years, besides the
preventive measures taken continuously
during mining, HBL have defined a
pnevention strategy whereby, in the most
recent incidents, the district involved has been
rapidly closed off, and then inerted. It was
possible subsequently to reopen the district
without difiiculty, and to rcsume operations
which then continued to the end of the
original schedule.
For this strategy to be effecäve it must be
possible for the district to be isolated very
quiddy; this technique is based on two main
requirements:
• closure Systems that are easy to operate;
• rapid inerting by injecting nitrogen into
the old workings.
2. FAST-ACTING DBTMCT CLOSURE
SYSTEMS
Various arrangements for rapidly closing off
districts have been tested, but here are
described only the two methods that have been
adopted for HBL strategy.
2.1 Water stopping (figure 3)
To implement a strategy based uppn the rapid
closure of a district by creating a water
stopping, a particular configuration is
required:
• There must be low points in the district
access roadways with a high enough change in
level. In fact this drop (d) must exceed the
height of the gallery (h) if the water stopping
is to be able to cope with the pressure surge
resulüng either from any explosion that occurs
or simpty from the additional gas introduced
by nitrogen inerting;
* Large quantities of water must be rapidly
available, because the volume of the water
stoppings may reach a few thousand cubic
metres and must be established äs quickly äs
possible.
For this method of closure to be used.
arrangements must be made when the district
workings are still at the design stage. In fact
the choice is either:
* To make use of a natural change in level
in the seam itself;
* Or to create a low point, not stricüy
necessary for normal working of the
panel, in both bottom and tail gätes.
Also, the water supplies to the district must
be sufficient to provide the necessary flow,
with the control valves positioned so that they
remain accessible from safe areas where the
atmosphere is clean.
2.2 Stoppings with fast-dosing doors
Erection ofthese stoppings must be completed
before work begins in the district.
They do not in fact represent additional
expenditure because they are erected outside
the panel to be worked and will serve äs
definitive closure dams when work on the
panel is complete and equipment has been
removed.
The stoppings should be erected on both
access roadways and be identical in principle
but with specific arrangements to :
* make allowance for the different equipment
used in these roadways;
* facilitate any subsequent reopening bf the
district.
a) Stopping in the retum gate (figure 4)
This is a solid stopping, built with good
quality anchoring, made of concrete or
anhydrite about 3 metres thick.
It is provided with apertures whose total
area is related to the Ventilation flow rate (of
the order of 35 to 45 n?/s) necessary in the
district in order to dilute the methane and to
maintain a breathable atmosphere for the
wölkers.
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(b) Water trap made h a seam drift
mainroad
seam
(c) Water trap made uslhg access roads
Figure 3: Rapid closure of a distdct by watcr trap
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i^ ure 4. Xapid 3iosuxs dam- m outict ars-fta^
a) Outside s-uriace
b) faiside surf'ace (coalface side)
Figure 4 bis: Rapid closure dam in outlet airway
Detail of explosion panels
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Hence there is:
* l door (1.9 x 2.6 m) capable of
withstanding a pressure surge of at least 2
atmospheres operated remotely by compressed
air, on each face of the stopping. The door
dimensions must be compatible with the space
taken up by a monorail that is easily
removable or against which the doors dose.
* 2 explosion panels, 800 nun or even l
metre in diameter, together'with their flaps
and a mechanical System for remote opening
and closing (to facilitate reopening of the dis-
trict). The electric cables passing through the
stopping are bundled inside pipes which are
carefülly sealed with a resin material.
* 2 or 3 short pipes let open on the side
facing "the coalface for subsequent operations
of:
checking the atmosphere behind the
stopping;
* inerting;
* injecting sealing materials. •
In certain circumstances it is worth
providing a water drain. This must then
terminate in a gooseneck on the accessible
side ofthe dam.
b) Stopping in the intake gate (figure 5)
This has the same geometry äs the dam in the
retum gate, although since there is usually a
conveyor belt in this roadway the stopping has
to be provided with a special System for
sealing off the conveyor compartment.
This System may be:
* a pneumatically operated shutter that grips
the conveyor belt in such a way äs to limit
Ventilation leakages. When this shutter has
been closed it is then necessary to finish its
sealing offusing expanded foam;
* a shutter fitted by hand after partially
dismanüing the conveyor. The other Systems
on this stopping will be the same äs those on
the stopping in the retum gate, i.e.:
* door with space for the monorail;
* explosion panel (a single panel is
suffident);
pipes for instruments, water removal,
injection or inerting.
As regards the stopping in the air intake
roadway, the closure Systems can either be
operated remotely (compressed air) or
manually.
The pneumatic controls are grouped on
control units which can be installed a few tens
of metres from the doors in an area where
there is no risk ofbad air.
3. EMERGENCY INTERVENTIONS
Despite the precautions taken during mimng
operations such äs:
* strict control of Ventilation;
conünuous monitoring of CH4, CO and
02 concentrations in the goaf and retum
roadway;
* limiting or eliminating air leaks;
* pressure balancing;
* preventive inerting.
HBL during the last six years have had to
deal with a number of critical situations (self-
heating in old woridngs (°x)), two of which
resulted in the ignition of gas in the goaf of
active faces. This led us to cany out six
emergency district dosures : these were
subsequently reopened in accordance with a
careftilly planned procedure.
3.1 Evacuation of workers
In the event of a rapidly developing incident,
for example a localised gas fire with the
release oflarge amounts oftoxic gases or even
smoke, it is essential to be able to contact all
workers äs quickly äs possible and give them
precise evacuation instroctions.
This is greatly facilitated by three factors :
a) The installation of a large number of
sensors in the galleries providing regulär data,
at very short time intervals, of changes in the
concentrations of gases (CH4, CO, O» ) äs
well äs any changes in Ventilation flow, all of
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which are essential for the extent of the
incident to be evaluated from the control and
monitoring Station at the surface. These
instruments also make it possible to select the
best route for withdrawing workers to a safe
area. Thus in each HBL mine, it is possible to
obtain information frcm about 150 sensors in
less than four minutes; these data are
processed by Computer and easüy retrieved in
the form oftrend curves.
b) The use of a dedicated telephone network
capable of continuously broadcasting pre-
recorded waming messages or instructions
appropriate to the circumstances, via a simple
selection procedure on a microcomputer in the
control room. Each HBL mine is fitted with
such a network (which is in fact a public
address System) which carries out a daily seif-
test
c) Workers are provided with individual seif
rescuers (closed circuit oxygen producüon)
with a sufficient reserve for them to reach the
fresh air muster points or slightly pressurized
shelters.
Thus every Charbonnages de France miner
always carries bis seif rescuer (Mini-Apeva)
capable of supplying him with 30 minutes of
oxygen, sufficient for him to reach the
pressurised shelters arranged along the roads
giving access to the woridngs (figure 6). The
locations of these shelters are determined on
the basis of a prior study of evacuation
pathways using simulations of the Ventilation
System, under normal working conditions and
in the event offire.
3.2 Intervention by rescue teams
In order to isolate the district in the safest
possible conditions, it is necessary first -
* to expose the smallest possible number of
workers;
* to take action quickly.
For these two reasons it is important to
recroit well-trained rescue teams and to equip
them with flameproof suits, high-capacity
breathing apparatus and even refrigerated
suits if the air is hot and, naturally, portable
monitoring equipment.
These rescue teams will go into action
simultaneously, being co-ordinated by the unit
manager in the surveillance and control room
on the suriäce.
The rescue leams working in the intake
airway can usually work in a breathable
atmosphere with no need to wear breathing
apparatus; however the team in the retum
airway will face a polluted atmosphere and
sometimes have to work in reduced visibility.
In these circumstances the rate of progress
will be dictated by whoever is working in the
more difficult conditions.
3.3Closure of doors and isolation of the
district
Once the decision has been taken to intake the
district, the task given to the rescue teams is
therefore simultaneously to dose the doors in
the previousty erected stoppings.
The Job ofthe team in the intake airway will
therefore be to clear away the monoraü
installation (dismantle a rail and cutting the
cable), to dose the shutter on the service
conveyor or dismantle it and seal the
compartment using expanded foam, to dean
up the door surroundings to ensure that it will
dose easily, and to check the functioning of
the explosion panel.
Besides dealing with the service conveyor,
the team in the retum gate will have the same
preparatory work to do, occasionally in
conditions of reduced visibility, wearing
breathing apparatus and continuously
monitoring the atmosphere, the results being
immediatdy transmitted to the control room.
To facilitate the task of these teams, the
equipment necessary. for this preparatory work
is placed in Containers which are instaüed
near the stoppings together with pumps and
Stocks of sealing resin.
The teams make regulär progress reports to
the control room so that the manager in
Charge of the operations can take whatever
- 9 -
a) Miners equipped with fhe Mini Apeva
b) Pressurised shelter
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measures are appropriate (adjusting the
Ventilation System, modifying the flow of
inerting nitrogen, and so on) in conjunction
with the engineers in the Ventilation Computer
centre who carry out the necessary simulations
in real time.
When the teams have completed their
preparatory work. they retreat to points
designated by the operations manager, report
in and await the closure Order.
This instruction is given by the manager in
Charge ofthe operations in such a way that the
district is closed off simultaneously at the two
stoppings. following an increase in the
amount of nitrogen injected into the district if
necessary.
The district is isolated by closing the large
doors (pneumatic remote Operation), and then
finally by closing the explosion panels.
During actual events at HBL, Ihe
preparatory work for the closures carried out
by the rescue teams required between one hour
and five hours (when there was smoke in the
return airway); simultaneous closure of the
doors took five to ten minutes.
Thus it is possible in less than eight hours to
isolate a district in which there has been
severe seif heating and buming gases, with
minimum exposure to workers and with
maximum precautions.
3.4 Inerting
Once the district has been isolated by closing
the doors and panels in the stoppmgs, the
inerting procedure shculd be carried out äs
quickly äs possible by :
* Continuing to seal off the stoppings (at the
anchoring points, door frames, pipe
penetrations, etc.) by spraying sealant;
* Adjusting the nitrogen flow to maintain an
overpressure at the stoppings on both
roadways;
* Assisting the removal of heat by
establishing an extraction flow, if possible,
.compensating for the excess nitrogen injected;
* Improving the sealing of the district by
additional injection sealing, etc.
4. REOPENING AN ISOLATED
DISTMCT
4.1 Monitoring the district
When a district has been isolated for the
reasons given. above, changes in its
atinosphere should be monitored frequently
from samples taken from the pipes penetrating
the stopping in the retum gate.
Depending on the changes occurring in the
difierent parameters monitored, a number of
other Jobs, of varying extent, will haye to be
carried out while a reopening strategy is
prepared.
4.2 The reopening strategy
The reopening strategy should be based upon
two factors:
a) Ventilation caiculations
These caiculations should be carried out
beforehand to give guidance during the
reopening Operation. They should also indi-
cate the methodology to be adopted for closing
the district again without risk if a fürther
uncontrolled incident should occur during the
reopening Operation.
They are based upon the need to avoid the
effects, first, of any sudden impact by too great
a natural pressure surge on the stopping in the
retum gate and, secondly, too high an air flow
during the reopening process.
The caiculations determine in advance :
* the extent to which work in the mine should
be halted even before operations commence;
* the possible flow rate through the district,
together with the pressure distribution after
every change made at the stoppings (door,
panels, etc.);
* the size of the optimal open section to
achieve the selected flow rate on coropletion
ofthe Operation.
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Figure 7: Schematic diagram:
PEGASSING A FACE AREA.
Figure 7: Schemattc diagra.m: degassmg a face area,
b) Preparatory work
This will involve :
* installing an adequate number of well-
placed sensors to monitor changes in the
atmosphere. within the confined zone and in
the primary Ventilation System during purging
ofthedistnct;
* installing a System to facilitate
decompression of the stopping in the retum
gate. and the purging of the confined zone.
This System may consist of a linc of rigid
ducts connected to one of the explosion
panels, terminatiRg at its other end in a
diluting duct operated remotely (figure 9).
c) Reopening the distrkt
District reopening is supemsed from the
control room at the surfäce havmg access in
real time to all the Information provided by
the sensors installed for monitoring the
Operation. Two teams are needed, both fülly
briefed on the procedure to be followed: one at
the stopping in the intake, the other at the
stopping in the retum end. Both teams are in
telephone communication with the conu-ol
centre and act only on its instructions.
The reopening procedure is in five stages
l. Passing on the overpressure at the
stopping to a purgc System exposed to
primary Ventilation
This is done by opening the flap in the
explosion panel to which the previously
installed purging line is connected. In this
way the high pressure is fed directiy to the
diluting duct exposed to substantial primary
Ventilation.
2 Decomprcssing the confined zone
This involves simply opening the diluting
duct at the end of the line. By this stage the
overpressure (500 Pa WG) has disappeared, a
small amount of gas has been driven out. but
äs yet no air is circulating in the distnct.
3 Controlled purge ofthe distnct
The order is then given IQ the team located
at the stopping in the intake airway to open
the flap on the explosion panel- Once this is
done. air begins to circulate naturally in the
district and will drive the gases to the outlet
System. The team at the retum side will then
adjust the position of the diluting duct so äs to
limit the flow in the district and observe the
ruies govenung the concentrations linüts in
the primary Ventilation downstream of the
stopping. When the diluting duct is fülly open
this indicates that preliminary degassing of
the district is complete.
4. Increasing the flow
The degassing process must then be
continued by gradually increasing the flow of
air into the district; the rate ofincrease in flow
is öontinuously monitored by a series of
sensors located in the Ventilation System in the
air return.
The following operations are carried out
in the order shown:
* the large door in the stopping in the intake
airway is opened;
* the second explosion panel at the air retum
side is opened:
* finally the door at the air retum is opened
and the flow adjusted to the desired value by
installing an air door having the aperture
section previously caiculated.
Throughout this Operation, nitrogen injection
and methane drainage must be constantly
adjusted. It is also important to check
regularly that the flow entering the district for
a given configuration agrees with the prior
caiculations for the same configuration.
Inspection of the district
This can be done once a flow of fresh air is
esiablished and the atmosphere in the retum
roadway is breathable. This inspection should
follow the direction of normal airflow.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The strategy developed at HBL. based upon
the construcüon of stoppings fitted with fast-
closing. remolely-conu-olled doors at the ends
of the roadways serving areas of longwall
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faces with'Sublevel recovery has proved ifs
worth.
In the last six years, these arrangements have
been used on six occasions, for closing off
districts in which serious incidents had
occurred, induding two gas fires with
considerable release oftoxic gases and smoke.
In every case, these arrangements have
allowed the workings to be reopened easily
and operations to restart.
This strategy is supplemented by:
• a reliable and effecüve warning System;
• a proven seif rescuer in which the
workers have confidence;
• a network of pressurised shelters;
• a nitrogen distribution system linked
directiy to a high capacity producüon unit
(12,000 m3^);
a workforce training programme.
To be successfül, this strategy also
necessitates
highiy motivated and properly trained
rescue teams;
a rigorous maintenance procedure for the
closure Systems (equipment stowed,
regulär cleaning of door frames, and so
on);
regulär monitoring of the Strategie
equipment (mjection pumps, Stocks of
resin, equipment Containers, etc.);
an advanced Ventilation Computer centre
with complete understanding of the
mine's Ventilation System, and provided
with the most up-to-date and
comprehensive Software for Ventilation
Simulation.
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